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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
In their Respondents' Brief ("RB"), Defendants Thomas R. Luciani and Stamper, 
Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P.S. ("Defendants" or "Luciani") misstate a critical threshold fact in 
this legal malpractice action: the identity of their former client. As the federal district court 
expressly found in its order certifying the question of assignability to this Court, Defendants' 
client in the underlying litigation was Magic Valley Regional Medical Center ("Magic Valley" 
or the "Hospital"), the predecessor-in-interest ofSt. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical 
Center ("St. Luke's"), Plaintiff and Appellant here. Yet in their brief to this Court, more than 
four years after this legal malpractice action was filed in 2008, Defendants now assert for the 
first time that their client was Twin Falls County, not the Hospital. RB at 2-3. That newly-found 
contention cannot be squared with the district court's order certifying the question to this Court 
or with the record before that court, including Defendants' own pleadings and sworn testimony. 
See Part Il(A), infra. Likewise, Defendants' denial that St. Luke's is Magic Valley's successor is 
inconsistent with the district court's contrary finding and with the undisputed record evidence 
that St. Luke's acquired substantially all of the Hospital's assets, real property, personnel, 
management, and business. See Part lI(B), infra. Finally, and most remarkably, Defendants 
never even address the broad assignment language of the Sales and Lease Agreement by which 
Magic Valley'S claims against Luciani were assigned to St. Luke's. See Part lI(C), infra. 
Defendants' key factual misstatements, in tum, cause them to misconceive the only 
substantive issue presented here: "whether St. Luke's (as Luciani's client's successor) can step 
into the shoes of Magic Valley for Magic Valley's legal malpractice claim against Luciani in 
light of the broad assignment language used in the Sale and Lease Agreement or are legal 
malpractice actions not assignable in Idaho as a matter of law." Order Certifying Question to 
1 
Idaho Supreme Court (D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2011) ("Order") at 4. 1 As St. Luke's emphasized in its 
opening brief (AOB at 16-20), the majority of courts to have addressed that question have held 
that a predecessor entity may assign a legal malpractice claim to its successor. See Part IV(A), 
infra. Rather than squarely address that body of authority, Defendants rely heavily on cases that 
involved very different facts. As St. Luke's pointed out in its opening brief, those states that 
have endorsed a blanket rule barring the assignment of legal malpractice claims nearly always 
have done so in cases where the purported assignment is to a stranger to the attorney-client 
relationship, such as the client's litigation adversary. See AOB at 27-29,31-32. But the public 
policy considerations in that context are entirely distinct from those presented in the very 
different context presented here, that of an assignment to a successor entity, and the blanket rule 
therefore should not apply. See id. at 32-35. Defendants' emphasis on those public policy 
concems (see RB at 20-31) is divorced from the undisputed facts of this case and glosses over 
that critical distinction. See Part IV(B), infra. Defendants' remaining technical arguments lack 
merit. See Part IV (C), infra. 
The blanket no-assignment rule advocated by Defendants, if accepted by this Court, 
would have the inequitable result of permitting negligent attomeys to escape liability due to the 
fortuity of a change in ownership of their client. See AOB at 21-22. Defendants'mistaken 
assertion as to the identity of their former client leads them to dismiss that concern by asserting 
that Twin Falls County "survives and, if it were damaged, would have been the proper party to 
assert a claim against Luciani." RB at 39. However, Luciani's actual former client, Magic 
1 Defendants also ask this Court to decide a number of additional issues. However, that 
request is improper because those issues are beyond the scope of the certified question, they raise 
questions of fact, and Defendants have waived them by failing to cite supporting authority. This 
Court's role is limited to answering the certified question. See Part III, infra. 
2 
Valley, did not survive the transaction by which all of its claims against third parties were 
assigned to St. Luke's, and therefore can no longer assert any claim against Luciani. The sole 
question posed here is whether the assignment of those claims to St. Luke's, its successor, was 
effective under Idaho law. In answering that question, rather than the very different one posed 
by Defendants, this Court should follow the majority of courts that enforce such assignments to 
successor entities. See Part IV(D), infra. 
II. DEFENDANTS HAVE MISSTATED THE FACTS FOUND BY THE FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN CERTIFYING THE QUESTION TO THIS COURT. 
At the outset, Defendants misstate key facts that bear directly on the question this Court 
agreed to decide. Defendants' characterization of the record is inconsistent with the facts found 
by the federal district court in its order certifying the question to this Court, and indeed with 
Defendants' own position in the underlying litigation. Defendants' attempt to rewrite the 
undisputed facts is improper and should be disregarded. 
A. Defendants' Client Was Magic Valley, Not Twin Falls County. 
This legal malpractice action arises out of Defendants' representation of Magic Valley 
Regional Medical Center, the predecessor-in-interest ofSt. Luke's Magic Valley Regional 
Medical Center. Remarkably, however, Defendants now deny-for the first time since this 
litigation was filed in 2008-that they had an attorney-client relationship with Magic Valley. 
Instead, they assert that Luciani's client was Twin Falls County, the Hospital's owner. RB at 2-3 
(asserting that "Twin Falls County was Luciani's client" and that "while St. Luke's took over 
ownership of certain buildings and the Hospital's business, it did not succeed to the ownership of 
Luciani's client, Twin Falls County"); id. at 40 ("Luciani's relationship only existed with Twin 
Falls County"). Based on this contention, Defendants assert that because Twin Falls County 
3 
(unlike Magic Valley) still exists, it would be the only proper party to assert a claim against 
them. RBat 39. Defendants' contentions are inconsistent with the district court's order and with 
the record. 
First and foremost, Defendants' newly-found position contradicts the district court's 
findings in its order certifying the question to this Court. At the very beginning of that order, 
after observing that the facts related to the issue "are not disputed by the parties," the district 
court expressly found that Luciani "represented Magic Valley Regional Medical Center ('Magic 
Valley') to defend a wrongful termination and False Claims Act action alleging fraudulent 
Medicare billing by Magic Valley ('the Suter litigation')." Order at 1-2 (footnote omitted); see 
also id at 2 (after his termination as "counsel for Magic Valley," Luciani "was no longer the 
attorney representing Magic Valley in the Suter litigation"). That finding is binding here. 
As noted in our opening brief (AOB at 15-16), in deciding questions of law certified to it 
by another court, this Court relies upon the facts as stated by the certifying court. See Kunz v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 792 P.2d 926, 927 & n.l (1990) (considering "only 
those facts contained in the [Ninth Circuit's certification] order"). Here, the district court 
expressly found that Luciani's client was the Hospital, not Twin Falls County. That Twin Falls 
County was "the Hospital's owner during the time period of Luciani's representation of the 
Hospital" (RB at 2) does not render it Defendants' "client," any more than an attorney 
representing a subsidiary of a corporation has a direct attorney-client relationship with the 
client's parent company. Cf JUB Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 311, 193 P .3d 
858, 864 n.4 (2008) (in legal malpractice action, attorney had an attorney-client relationship with 
a subsidiary of plaintiff parent company, which filed a motion to substitute subsidiary as the real 
party in interest after defendants challenged whether parent was the appropriate party-plaintiff); 
see generally Tucker v. Union Oil Co. a/California, 100 Idaho 590, 603 P.2d 156, 160-61 (1979) 
4 
("Ownership of capital stock in one corporation by another does not, itself, create an identity of 
interest between the two companies") (citations and internal quotations omitted).2 
Second, the district court's finding is fully supported by the record before that court, 
including Luciani's own sworn testimony. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, not Twin 
Falls County, was named as a defendant by the parties to the Suter litigation. See Suter 
Litigation Compls. [Tompkins Dec., Exs. 9, 12 and 13].3 As Luciani himself admitted in his 
deposition, he and his firm were retained to represent Magic Valley, not the County, in that 
litigation. Luciani Dep. 24: 17-25: 16,29: 1 0-14 [Call Dec., Ex. 8] (Luciani's testimony that he 
was asked by Truck Insurance Exchange "to represent the Hospital" and that he understood he 
was "defending the hospital"); RB at 8 ("Luciani and his law firm were retained by the 
Hospital"); see Notice of Withdrawal and Substitution of Counsel (July 15, 2003) [Tompkins 
Dec., Ex. 3] (substitution of Defendants "as attorneys of record for Defendant Magic Valley 
Regional Medical Center"). Likewise, it was "Hospital executives," not County officials, to 
whom Luciani reported regarding his representation of Magic Valley. RB at 8 (discussing 
2 For this reason, Defendants' contention that Twin Falls County "would have been the 
proper party to assert a claim against Luciani" (RB at 39) is erroneous: as a general rule, an 
attorney's duty runs to his or her client, not to third parties who may have an ownership or other 
interest in the client. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P .3d 884, 887 (2004). 
3 It is hardly unusual that the plaintiffs in the Suter litigation named Magic Valley rather 
than Twin Falls County as a party defendant. Over the years, parties to numerous cases 
involving a wide variety of subjects ranging from slip-and-fall cases to medical malpractice 
actions followed the same practice. See, e.g., Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Magic Valley 
Regional.Medical Center, 138 Idaho 143,59 P.3d 314 (2002); Robertson v. Magic Valley 
Medical Center, 117 Idaho 979, 793 P.2d 211 (1990). In contrast, where Twin Falls County is 
the proper party defendant, litigants have separately named it as such. See, e.g., Chisholm v. 
Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131,75 P.3d 185 (2003); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 
210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990). 
5 
Luciani's "telephone calls with Hospital executives and with the Hospital's general counsel"). 
And it was Magic Valley, not the County, that was forced to replace Defendants as counsel after 
their malpractice threatened it with multi-million dollar exposure. See Notice of Substitution of 
Counsel (Mar. 14,2006) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 4] (substitution out of Luciani as "local counsel 
for Defendant Magic Valley Regional Medical Center"). 
Third, if all of this were not enough, Defendants' contention that their client was Twin 
Falls County, not Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, is flatly inconsistent with the position 
that Defendants themselves repeatedly took before the district court. As noted in our opening 
brief (AOB at 4), in their original answer to the complaint in the district court, Defendants 
admitted that they had an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's. Later, however, 
Defendants sought to withdraw that admission by filing a motion to amend their Answer, which 
the district court granted. In the very first sentence of that motion, Defendants stated, 
"Defendants represented Magic Valley Regional Medical Center ('MVRMC') in underlying 
litigation from July, 2003 to March 14,2006." Memo. in Support ofDefs.' Motion for Leave to 
Amend Answer (Dec. 15,2010) at 1; see also id at 3 ("Defendants represented Magic Valley 
Regional Medical Center, a unit of Twin Falls County, Idaho (,MVRMC'), in the underlying 
lawsuit"). That motion discussed in detail Defendants' representation of Magic Valley, and 
argued that Defendants' admission that they had an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's 
was inadvertent. Id at 3-7. Nowhere in that motion-the precise focus of which was the 
identity of their client-did Defendants ever suggest that their client had been Twin Falls County 
rather than Magic Valley. Thus, even ifthis Court were not bound by the district court's 
findings and the record, Defendants would be estopped from taking positions inconsistent with 
their own prior representations to the district court. See Heinze v. Bauer, 178 P.3d 597, 600 
(Idaho 2008) ("judicial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose with 
6 
the courts") (citation omitted).4 
B. St. Luke's Is Magic Valley's Successor In Interest. 
Defendants take a similarly revisionist approach to the transaction by which St. Luke's 
succeeded to Magic Valley's claims. Defendants contend that St. Luke's did not succeed to the 
ownership of Luciani's purported "client," Twin Falls County, but merely acquired sufficient 
assets from the County to enable it "to continue some discrete portion of the seller's business." 
RB at 3-4, 32. Defendants expressly deny that the Hospital merely changed its name and that St. 
Luke's is Magic Valley's "successor," arguing that label does not apply here and that the public 
policy reasons for allowing a successor entity to assert claims it received by assignment from a 
predecessor therefore should not apply here. Id at 3, 32. Again, however, Defendants' 
contentions are belied by the district court's findings and the undisputed record. 
As discussed at length in our opening brief (AOB at 5-8), and as the district court 
expressly found, the 2006 transaction by which St. Luke's acquired its claims against Defendants 
from Magic Valley involved "the transfer or sale of the assets and liabilities associated with the 
operation of Magic Valley." Order at 3. The leased or transferred assets included, among other 
things, the real property containing the land and buildings comprising the campus of Magic 
Valley, as well as certain out-patient facilities, physician office buildings, physician offices and 
sites of health care delivery and ancillary medical services; all tangible personal property owned, 
used, maintained or operated by the Hospital; and "[a]ll of the Hospital's contracts, agreements 
4 Notably, in their brief to this Court, Defendants admit that they were retained to 
represent Magic Valley, not the County. See, e.g., RB at 7 ("Luciani Defended the Hospital in 
the Suter Litigation"); id at 8 ("Luciani and his law firm were retained by the Hospital"); see 
also id at 15 ("St. Luke's has brought this legal malpractice action against Luciani for his 
representation of the Hospital"). 
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and leases." Sale and Lease Agreement §§ 2.1 (a),(b), 2.2(b) at 5 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]. Thus, 
as Defendants acknowledge, St. Luke's was formed to own and operate the Hospital after the 
asset purchase, in which it took over ownership of the Hospital's buildings and business. RB at 
3. While that transaction technically took the form of an asset and liability transfer rather than a 
merger, the net result was closely similar: after the transaction closed, "Magic Valley ceased to 
exist and the operation and management of the regional medical center was taken over by St. 
Luke's. The Magic Valley management team became the St. Luke's management team with 
some minor modifications." Order at 3.5 
Thus, as the district court found, St. Luke's is "Luciani's former client's successor." 
Order at 4. The question presented here arises and should be decided in that context, not in an 
entirely dissimilar context such as the assignment of a legal malpractice claim to a client's 
litigation adversary in settlement of that litigation. Cf RB at 27,31. 
C. Defendants Fail To Mention The Key Contractual Language By Which St. 
Luke's Was Assigned "Any .. . Claims Against Third Parties By The 
Hospital." 
As the district court expressly noted, the Sale and Lease Agreement contained unusually 
"broad assignment language" (Order at 4): 
[I]t is the intent of the Parties that all property and interests of the 
Hospital whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, be leased, 
sold assigned, licensed or transferred by [the] County and the 
[Magic Valley] subsidiaries ... to [St. Luke's] (including any 
rights of first refusal, options or claims against third parties by the 
Hospital and settlements received thereto, whether or not reflected 
5 As St. Luke's showed in its opening brief, an assignment of a legal malpractice claim to 
a successor may be effective regardless of the technical form of the transaction by which the 
claim is transferred. AOB at 19-21. Defendants do not contest the point or respond to any of the 
cases cited for that proposition. 
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on the Hospital's Balance Sheet and whether known or unknown, 
contingent or otherwise. 
Order at 3 (emphasis added), quoting Sale and Lease Agreement § 2.5 at 6 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 
7]. Although Defendants quote a short excerpt from this key provision (see RB at 4), they omit 
anywhere in their lengthy brief to address the broad assignment language (italicized above) that 
forms the basis for the certification order. That broad language ("any ... claims against third 
parties by the Hospital ... , whether known or unknown, contingent or otherwise") easily 
encompasses any claims for legal malpractice against Luciani, as the district court impliedly 
found in certifying the assignability issue to this Court. 
III. DEFENDANTS IMPROPERLY ASK THIS COURT TO DECIDE ISSUES 
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE CERTIFIED QUESTION. 
Toward the end oftheir lengthy brief, Defendants raise a number of issues that are 
beyond the scope of the certified question in this case. Thus, Defendants contend that any 
assignment of Magic Valley's claims against them to St. Luke's was ineffective because the 
language of the Asset Purchase Agreement broadly assigned any "claims against third parties by 
the Hospital" without explicitly referring to a legal malpractice claim and without a separate 
assignment agreement. Id. at 37-38.6 Defendants also assert that "Twin Falls County had no 
legal malpractice action to assign" (RB at 2) because no cause of action had accrued against 
6 Defendants make the unsupported assertion that "[t]he parties' failure to reference legal 
malpractice claims in the Agreement, and to execute transactional documents as with other 
assigned rights and liabilities, renders the alleged assignment insufficiently specific to be given 
any effect." RB at 37-38. Even if that issue were within the scope of the certified question, by 
failing to cite any authority in support of that argument, Defendants have waived it. A party 
waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); State 
v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 966,970 (1996). 
9 
Luciani before the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement and because Twin Falls County 
purportedly "sustained no damage due to any purported negligence by Luciani." Id. at 38-41.7 
Finally, Defendants ask this Court to decide that claims for punitive damages are not assignable. 
Id. at 41. None of these issues is properly presented here, as each is beyond the scope of the 
question certified to this Court by the district court, and some raise questions of fact not suitable 
for resolution by this Court. Indeed, the district court expressly so noted. See Order at 4 
("Whether the alleged legal malpractice claim occurred or caused harm is disputed by the parties, 
but those disputed facts do not appear to impact the legal question of assignability of a legal 
malpractice claim"). 
In Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102 (1987), the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to this Court the question whether certain sections of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts are consistent with Idaho law and create a duty of care on the 
part of a party to a contract to the employees ofthe other contracting party. The Court, 
observing that the question presented "is a narrow one," declined to decide whether such a duty 
could be created by any other provision of law. The Court stated that "[o]ur role is limited to 
answering the certified question," and that "[f]or us to now decide the matter would result in an 
advisory opinion on a question not certified." Id. at 103. Precisely the same reasoning and 
conclusion follow here. This Court should decide the question certified to it by the district court, 
not the additional factual questions that Defendants now raise in their brief. 
7 Defendants make the related assertion that St. Luke's would have paid more in cash for 
the Hospital's assets if it had not assumed liability for the pending Suter litigation. RB at 4-5, 
28. Defendants do not cite any evidence in the record to support that factual assertion. Nor do 
they point to any evidence that the transaction could have been successfully negotiated or closed 
without such an assumption of liability. 
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IV. MAGIC VALLEY'S ASSIGNMENT OF ITS LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
TO ST. LUKE'S, ITS SUCCESSOR, WAS EFFECTIVE UNDER IDAHO LAW. 
As St. Luke's showed in its opening brief, the majority of courts to have addressed the 
specific question presented here-whether an entity may assign a legal malpractice claim to its 
successor-have answered that question in the affirmative. AOB at 16-21. Defendants do not 
address those cases until nearly the end of their brief. RB at 35-39. Rather, they rely principally 
on cases which involved a very different issue: whether a party may assign a legal malpractice 
claim to a litigation adversary or other unrelated third party. But those cases not only arose on 
different facts, they presented public policy considerations that do not apply in the context of 
assignment to a successor entity. This Court should follow the majority rule and hold that an 
entity may assign a legal malpractice claim to its successor. 
A. The Majority Of Courts Hold That An Entity May Assign A Legal 
Malpractice Claim To Its Successor. 
The majority of courts to have addressed the issue before this Court hold that an entity 
may assign a legal malpractice claim to its successor as part of an overall transaction, such as the 
St. Luke's Transaction in which Magic Valley transferred assets and liabilities to St. Luke's. See 
generally Annot., Assignability of Claim for Legal Malpractice, 64 A.L.R.6th 473 § 2 (2011) 
("Legal malpractice claims, transferred along with other assets and obligations to an assignee in 
a commercial transaction, may be assignable"); 4 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice § 26.10 at 
1018 (2011 ed.) ("The reported decisions have tended to treat a 'successor' entity as able to 
assert the legal rights of the predecessor, including a pre-existing malpractice claim .... ") 
(footnote omitted); AOB at 16-21. The courts that follow that rule include the high courts of 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. See Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 
1057 (R.I. 1999) (holding as a matter of first impression that "legal malpractice claims, 
transferred along with other assets and obligations to an assignee in a commercial transaction, 
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are assignable"); Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1987) 
(assignment by client patentee of "all rights and causes of action" against attorney arising out of 
mishandling of patent application was effective under Pennsylvania law). 
Still other courts, including courts in Oregon, Maine, and Massachusetts, allow voluntary 
assignment on a case-by-case basis, refusing to adopt the blanket rule against assignability that 
Defendants advocate here. See AOB at 31-35; see also Villanueva v. First American Title Ins. 
Co., 313 Ga. App. 164, 721 S.E.2d 150 (2011) (holding as a matter of first impression under 
Georgia law that mortgage lender's legal malpractice claim was assignable to title insurer, while 
acknowledging that "there may be cases where the special nature of the attorney-client 
relationship precludes assignment"). 
Defendants do not deny that courts generally uphold assignment of legal malpractice 
claims to a successor corporation as part of a larger commercial transaction such as the St. 
Luke's Transaction. Indeed, one of Defendants' own cases explicitly acknowledged that the 
general rule barring the assignment of legal malpractice claims "did not bar a legal malpractice 
claim that was assigned to a successor corporation, which was a direct continuation of its 
predecessor." Rosby Corp. v. Townsend, Yosha, Cline & Price, 800 N.E.2d 661, 667 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2003), citing Summit Account and Computer Service, Inc. v. RJH of Florida, Inc., 690 
N.E.2d 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Defendants do not cite a single case in which a court squarely 
refused to enforce such an assignment. 8 Instead, Defendants urge this Court to adopt a blanket 
8 Defendants' other cases (RB at 33-37) involved purported assignments to litigation 
adversaries or other strangers to the attorney-client relationship, rather than to a true successor 
entity such as St. Luke's. See Delaware CWC Liquidation Corp. v. Martin, 584 S.E.2d 473 (W. 
Va. 2003) (clients assigned legal malpractice claims to their adversaries in settlement of 
underlying litigation); Earth Science Labs., Inc. v. Adkins & Wondra, P.e., 523 N.W.2d 254 
(Neb. 1994) (plaintiff assignee acquired debtor's assets from debtor in bankruptcy); MNC Credit 
(Continued ... ) 
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rule banning any assignment of legal malpractice claims. However, as shown in the next section, 
none of the policy considerations offered by courts for such a rule applies in the context of 
assignment to a successor entity. 
B. None Of The Public Policy Considerations On Which Defendants Rely 
Applies In The Context Of Assignment To A Successor Entity. 
The issue of first impression posed here does not tum principally on provisions of the 
Idaho Code or existing case authority. Rather, as Defendants acknowledge, "[t]he basis for 
finding a survivable cause of action non-assignable is public policy." RB at 21. Defendants 
argue at length that for a variety of policy reasons, this Court should conclude that a legal 
malpractice claim is not assignable. Id at 24-31. But as we have shown, even ifthese 
considerations were persuasive in the abstract,9 none applies in the specific context involved 
here: the assignment of a legal malpractice claim by a predecessor entity to its successor. See 
AOB at 32-35. Accordingly, this Court should not reflexively apply a blanket rule of non-
assignability, as Defendants urge. The considerations underlying that general rule simply do not 
apply in the circumstances of this case. Cerberus Partners, 728 A. 2d at 1 060 (concluding that 
Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331 (Va. 1998) (client assigned rights to sister subsidiary 
corporation); Rosby Corp. v. Townsend, Yosha, Cline & Price, 800 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003) (debtor corporation in bankruptcy assigned rights to creditor in settlement agreement); 
New Falls Corp. v. Lerner, 579 F. Supp. 2d 282 (D. Conn. 2008), aff'd, 352 Fed. Appx. 596 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (client lender under loan and equipment leasing agreements assigned assets including 
legal malpractice action to third party, which later re-assigned them to plaintiff New Falls) 
(applying California law); Law Office of Stern v. Security Nat. Corp., 969 So.2d 962,964 (Fla. 
2007) (underlying mortgage and note on which attorney filed untimely foreclosure action were 
"assigned several times before Security National finally acquired them during the appeal in the 
foreclosure action"). 
9 As St. Luke's has shown, the blanket rule barring assignment of legal malpractice 
claims-alone among all other types of claims-has been the subject of considerable criticism. 
See AOB at 29 n.9. 
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such public policy reasons do not mandate "blind adherence to a general rule of prohibition in all 
cases of assignment"); Gurski v. Rosenblum and Filan, LLC, 885 A.2d 163, 171 (Conn. 2005) 
("In examining all ofthe aforementioned considerations, we are not persuaded that every 
voluntary assignment of a legal malpractice action should be barred as a matter of law") 
(footnote omitted). "An assignment of a malpractice claim by one corporation to another as part 
of a merger or acquisition does not present these concerns." Gregory v. Lolien, 26 P .3d 180, 184 
(Or. App. 2001), citing Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353, 357-58 (D.D.C. 1996); see 
also cases cited, AOB at 29. As this Court long ago recognized, even if the reasoning un.derlying 
a general rule is sound, "it does not follow that the rule ofthe common law must forever remain 
fixed and unyielding in all cases and under all circumstances." Good v. Good, 311 P.2d 756, 
758-599 (Idaho 1957) (discussing the common law maxim that "where the reason of a rule 
ceased the rule also ceased"); see also Matter of Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 47 (Idaho 
1985) (common law is "judge-made law based upon reason and common sense," is flexible, and 
adapts itself to varying conditions) (Bistline, J., concurring). 
1. The "Unique Character of Legal Services" Does Not Justify Barring 
An Entity From Assigning A Claim To Its Successor. 
Defendants argue first that assignment should not be allowed because of "the unique 
character oflegal services," including the personal nature of the attorney's duty and the 
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. RB at 24-25. But that consideration simply 
does not apply where, as here, the only material change was in the corporate ownership of the 
client. The Hospital's assets, facilities, and business remained the same before and after the 
closing of the St. Luke's Transaction, as did its employees and management. See AOB at 5-6; 
Order at 3 ("The Magic Valley management team became the St. Luke's management tean1 with 
some minor modifications"). Thus, the "Hospital executives" and employees (RB at 8) whom 
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Luciani had previously defended, and to whom he reported, remained in the same positions. 10 
Nothing about the formal change in ownership of the Hospital from Twin Falls County to St. 
Luke's, or the County's assignment of its claims against third parties to St. Luke's as part of the 
overall transaction, in any way interfered with the fiduciary or confidential nature of the 
attorney-client relationship. Nor could it have, because Magic Valley ceased to exist following 
the closing of the St. Luke's Transaction. See AOB at 13. Moreover, as Defendants emphasize, 
Luciani was discharged as counsel to Magic Valley before the execution of the Sale and Lease 
Agreement. RB at 12. 
Thus, on the undisputed facts involved here, there was no ongoing attorney-client 
relationship between Luciani and Magic Valley with which the assignment of Magic Valley's 
claims against Luciani could have interfered. To the contrary, St. Luke's simply stepped into 
Magic Valley's shoes in the pending litigation, in which Defendants themselves treated St. 
Luke's as Magic Valley's successor. In nearly everyone of the cases on which Defendants rely, 
in contrast, the individual or corporate client continued to exist following the attempted 
assignment, and the assignment of the client's claims against its attorneys to its litigation 
adversary or other unrelated third party therefore threatened directly to jeopardize the attorney-
client relationship. 
10 Of course, "[a]s fictitious entities, corporations can seek and receive legal advice and 
communicate with counsel only through individuals empowered to act on behalf of the 
corporation." Admiral Ins. Co. v. Us. Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1989). Those 
individuals remained the same after the closing of the St. Luke's Transaction. 
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2. Assignment To A Successor Does Not "Undermine The Attorney-
Client Relationship." 
For similar reasons, Defendants' closely-related argument that assignment would 
"undermine the attorney-client relationship" (RB at 26-28) is unpersuasive. Specifically, 
Defendants contend that assignment would eliminate the client's control over the attorney's 
disclosure of confidential information or inhibit a client's transfer of such information to the 
attorney, and would create conflicts of interest between the attorney and the client in the context 
of settlement negotiations. Id. Again, however, neither concern has any application in the 
undisputed context of this case, which involves assignment to a successor entity as part of a 
larger commercial transaction. 
First, Defendants argue that because an attorney may utilize confidential information 
revealed by the client to defend against a claim oflegal malpractice, assignment of the claim 
deprives the client of the ability to prevent the release of such information by dismissing the 
malpractice litigation. RB at 26. Defendants contend that for that reason, the potential for 
assignment may cause a client to restrict an attorney's access to valuable information to prevent 
such disclosure in the event of a future assignment. Id. Putting aside the speculative nature of 
this argument, these considerations are inapposite in the situation involved here, that of an 
assignment to a corporate successor. As the district court noted, after the St. Luke's Transaction 
closed, "Magic Valley ceased to exist and the operation and the operation and management of 
the regional medical center was taken over by St. Luke's." Order at 3. Under well-established 
case authority, control of the Hospital's attorney-client privilege passed to St. Luke's, which 
succeeded to the Hospital's management. CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985) ("when 
control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the 
corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well. New managers installed as a result of a 
takeover, merger, loss of confidence by shareholders, or simply normal succession, may waive 
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the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications made by former officers and 
directors"). Under the circumstances, St. Luke's did not lose the ability to control disclosure of 
its confidential information, and its predecessor Magic Valley would have had no reason to 
restrict Luciani's access to confidential information. 
Second, Defendants raise the specter that if assignment is allowed, a litigation adversary 
may agree to a settlement in exchange for assignment of any legal malpractice claims the client 
may have against his attorney, thereby placing the attorney in a conflict of interest and 
influencing the attorney's duty of loyalty. RB at 28-29, citing Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & 
Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966) and State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Estep, 873 
N.E.2d 1021 (Ind. 2007). In numerous cases cited by Defendants, clients assigned legal 
malpractice claims to their litigation adversaries in settlement of the underlying litigation. 11 
While that prospect undoubtedly raises troubling issues, such as the risk of collusion between the 
client and its adversary, those concerns are entirely absent where, as here, an entity assigns 
claims against third parties as part of an overall transfer of assets and liabilities to a successor, 
and the successor continues the underlying litigation. The two situations could not be more 
different. 
11 E.g., Gurski, 885 A.2d 163 (judgment debtor assigned to judgment creditor bankruptcy 
estate's interest in legal malpractice action); id at 173 (noting that "two jurisdictions, Texas and 
Washington, preclude assignment oflegal malpractice actions when, as here, the assignment is to 
an adverse party in the underlying action") (footnote omitted); AOB at 31-32. A number of 
those courts narrowly limited their holdings to that situation. E.g., Gurski, 885 A.2d at 164 ("We 
conclude that an assignment of a legal malpractice claim or the proceeds from such a claim to an 
adversary in the same litigation that gave rise to the alleged malpractice is against public policy 
and thereby unenforceable"); cf id at 171 ("we are not persuaded that every voluntary 
assignment of a legal malpractice action should be barred as a matter of law") (footnote omitted); 
see AOB at 29. 
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3. Assignment To A Successor Will Not "Increase Litigation." 
Defendants' further contention that the assignment oflegal malpractice claims "increases 
litigation" (RB at 28-30) is entirely unsupported on the record of this case. The concern that 
assignments may "create a marketplace for legal malpractice claims" (id. at 29) simply has no 
application to a larger transaction in which, as here, an entity transfers substantially all of its 
assets and liabilities to a new corporate owner, including claims against third parties. Certainly, 
Defendants do not suggest, nor could they, that Magic Valley's claim against Luciani was a 
substantial motivating factor in St. Luke's overall acquisition of the Hospital's assets and 
business. Moreover, as Defendants themselves emphasize (RB at 12), the parties did not execute 
the Sale and Lease Agreement until after Magic Valley had discharged Luciani and substituted in 
new counsel. In short, "we are not dealing here with a situation where a legal malpractice claim 
was transferred to a person without any other rights or obligations being transferred along with 
it." Cerebrus Partners, L.P., 728 A.2d at 1059; accord, Richter, 940 F. Supp. at 358 (legal 
malpractice claim "was not bartered or sold to an unrelated third party"). l2 
4. Assignment To A Successor Does Not "Impact Negatively On The 
Public's Perception of the Legal Profession." 
Finally, Defendants contend that the assignment of legal malpractice claims "reinforces 
negative public perception of the legal profession" because it can require attorneys to "advocate 
patently contradictory positions in successive proceedings." RB at 30-31. Again, however, no 
l2 Defendants misplace their reliance on InLiner Americas, Inc. v. Macomb Funding 
Group, LLC, 348 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010), which they describe as involving "transfer of 
assets in a commercial setting." RB at 29-30. In that case, after debtors defaulted on a secured 
loan and their creditor began proceedings to foreclose on the collateral, the debtors assigned the 
collateral to the creditor, including all assignable causes of action the debtors owned or later 
acquired. The Texas Court of Appeals held that the debtors' legal malpractice claims were not 
assignable. Thus, InLiner Americas, like many of Defendants' cases, involved an attempted 
assignment to a litigation adversary, not to a successor entity. 
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such risk is posed by assignment of a legal malpractice to a successor entity that, like St. Luke's, 
simply steps into the shoes of its predecessor. St. Luke's was not forced, by virtue of that 
assignment, to take any position inconsistent with Magic Valley's prior position in the same 
litigation. Magic Valley was not judgment-proof, nor did it collude with an opponent to assign 
any claims against its counsel to its litigation adversary. None of those concerns is remotely 
posed by an entity's assignment oflegal malpractice claims as part of an overall commercial 
transaction such as the St. Luke's Transaction. 
C. Defendants' Other Arguments Lack Merit. 
Defendants briefly make two other technical arguments: that a legal malpractice cause of 
action should not be assignable because it sounds in tort rather than contract (RB at 17-18) and 
because at the time of the assignment, legal malpractice claims did not survive under Idaho law. 
RB at 19-20. Neither argument is persuasive. 
As to the first argument, labeling a legal malpractice claim as a "tort" or "contract" cause 
of action is not determinative. This Court has explicitly recognized that legal malpractice actions 
are "an amalgam of tort and contract theories." Bishop v. Owens, 2012 WL 90411 at *3, --- P.3d 
---- (Jan. 12,2012), quoting Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 72, 652 P.2d 650,652 (1982); accord, 
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd, 150 Idaho 521, 248 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2011) ("A legal 
malpractice action is based on a combination of tort and contract theories"); see AOB at 25 & 
n.6. As the Connecticut Supreme Court observed persuasively, because an action for legal 
malpractice can be pleaded either in contract or in tort, "rather than strain to fit each legal 
malpractice claim into a category often determined by counsel based on concerns not relevant to 
the inquiry at hand, we think the better approach is to resolve the issue uniformly on the basis of 
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public policy." Gurski, 885 A.2d at 162.13 
As to the second, as Defendants acknowledge, "[w]here there is legislation on 
survivability, survivability and assignment in most jurisdictions have now been disconnected for 
purposes of determining the assignability of a legal malpractice claim." RB at 20. Indeed, in its 
recent decision in Bishop v. Owens, which held that a legal malpractice cause of action abated 
upon the death of the individual plaintiff, this Court expressly declined to address the argument 
that "the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship suggests that legal malpractice claims 
are not assignable." 2012 WL 90411 at *4 ("This Court need not specifically address this issue 
because Shelton's legal malpractice claim abated"). Bishop thus strongly suggests that the two 
issues are no longer logically linked under Idaho law. 14 As Defendants also concede, as a result 
of the enactment ofIdaho Code § 5-327(2), a legal malpractice claim in this State now survives 
the death of an individual plaintiff. See AOB at 26 n.7; RB at 20. Thus, neither point resolves 
the issue here, which turns almost entirely on public policy considerations. 
13 Defendants argue that in Bishop, this Court "necessarily" concluded a legal malpractice 
cause of action is not a "thing in action" under Idaho Code § 55-402. RB at 23. Not so: Bishop 
did not mention § 55-402, nor did it address the assignability issue presented here. 
14 In light of Bishop, which was decided after St. Luke's filed its opening brief, the 
analogy we drew to survivability of individuals' claims (AOB at 24-26) is not accurate. As 
noted, however, Bishop expressly declined to decide the issue before the Court here, but instead 
limited its holding to the application of the abatement rule. See 2012 WL 90411 at *3 ("under 
the abatement rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract"). Bishop did not involve 
assignment to a successor entity in the context of a larger commercial transaction, but instead 
arose when the plaintiffs personal representative sought to assert her legal malpractice claims 
after the plaintiff passed away during the pendency of the litigation. 
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D. Defendants' Blanket No-Assignment Rule Would Permit Attorneys To 
Escape Liability For Negligence Due to the Fortuity of a Change In 
Corporate Ownership. 
For the foregoing reasons, the public policy considerations cited by courts to bar 
assignment of legal malpractice claims in some circumstances do not apply in the context of an 
assignment to a successor as part of a larger merger or other transaction. Moreover, if the Court 
were to accept Defendants' blanket rule in this context, it would lead to inequitable results, 
because it would permit attorneys entirely to escape liability for the consequences of their legal 
malpractice merely because of an unrelated change in ownership of the client. See AOB at 21-
22. As Defendants observe, an invalid assignment generally has no effect on the validity of the 
underlying cause of action; thus, in those jurisdictions that follow a no-assignment rule, the 
assignor may still pursue the legal malpractice claim as the real party in interest. RB at 39 
(citing Tate v. Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon, 24 S.W.3d 627, 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2000); see also Davis v. Scott, 320 S.W.3d 87,91-92 (Ky. 2010) (collecting authorities). 
However, where, as here, the assignor ceases to exist as a result of the very transaction by which 
the assignment was to have been effected, the result of adopting Defendants' inflexible rule 
would be that nobody could pursue the claim. That result would allow an attorney to escape the 
consequences of his legal malpractice by the happenstance ofa change in ownership of his 
corporate client. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed, that result would be 
inequitable. Hedlund, 539 A.2d at 359 ("We will not allow the concept of the attorney-client 
relationship to be used as a shield by an attorney to protect him or her from the consequences of 
legal malpractice"). 
Defendants' response (RB at 38-39) is unpersuasive. They rely on a Minnesota decision 
which rejected the Pennsylvania court's reasoning that refusing to allow assignment oflegal 
malpractice claims would improperly shield an attorney from the consequences of legal 
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malpractice, reasoning that "[t]he client would still be able to bring any and all legal malpractice 
claims against his or her attorney." Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188,192 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1993).15 But as shown above, the argument is based on a false factual premise: Magic 
Valley ceased to exist following the closing of the Sale and Lease Agreement, and therefore 
cannot assert any claims against Luciani. Moreover, it was St. Luke's, rather than Magic Valley, 
that suffered the lion's share of the damages caused by Luciani's malpractice when it was forced 
to incur uninsured attorneys' fees and ultimately to pay millions of dollars to settle the Suter 
Litigation. See AOB at 12-13. If this Court were to accept Defendants' position and adopt a 
blanket no-assignment rule, therefore, the consequence would be that the merits of St. Luke's 
claim against Luciani would never be determined, since there is no existing party that could 
assert that claim. That result would be inequitable, and would be inconsistent with Idaho courts' 
strong policy in favor of deciding claims on their merits. Cf Bunn v. Bunn, 587 P.2d 1245, 
1246 (Idaho 1978) ("It has long been judicial policy in Idaho that controversies be determined 
and disposed of each on its own particular facts and as substantial justice may require. The 
exercise of judicial discretion should tend to bring about a judgment on the merits"). 
IS In Wagener, client sellers, against whom judgment was entered in an action arising out 
of the sale of real property, assigned all their rights in any claims against their attorney to a co-
defendant in settlement of the co-defendant's claims against them. 509 N.W.2d at 189. As in 
many of Defendants' cited cases, the assignee thus was the client's litigation adversary, not its 
successor in interest. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should answer the question certified to it by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Idaho as follows: 
On the undisputed facts here, which involve "an asset and liability transfer from Magic 
Valley to S1. Luke's" that included an assignment of "all claims against third parties by the 
Hospital," Magic Valley's assignment to S1. Luke's of its legal malpractice claims against 
Luciani was effective under Idaho law. 
Dated: March 28,2012 
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